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 E x e c u t i v e   S u m m a r y
The Treaty has made the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) very independent. Nowa-
days is it widely believed that a high level 
of central bank independence and an ex-
plicit mandate for the bank to restrain in-
flation are important institutional devices 
to assure price stability. It is thought that 
an independent central bank can give full 
priority to low levels of inflation. In coun-
tries with a more dependent central bank 
other considerations (notably, re-election 
perspectives of politicians and a low level 
of unemployment) may interfere with the 
objective of price stability. Recent empirical 
research on central bank independence has 
also shown that the negative relationship 
between central bank independence and 
inflation is quite robust. Before the ECB 
started its operations, the main elements of 
its monetary policy had been decided upon 
by the Governing Council in October 1998. 
The original strategy consisted of three ele-
ments. First, the Council provided a formal 
definition of price stability, i.e. yearly infla-
tion for the euro area of less than two per-
cent in the medium term. Second, money 
growth was assigned a prominent role in 
the assessment of the risks to price stabil-
ity. This was known as the first pillar of the 
ECB’s monetary policy. Third, a broadly 
based evaluation of the threat to price sta-
bility, using a wide array of economic and 
financial variables. This was the second pil-
lar. In May 2003 the ECB announced the 
outcomes of its internal evaluation of this 
strategy. Even though the ECB stressed the 
continuity of its strategy and stated that 
the decisions taken were merely about clar-
ification, these decisions have been widely 
interepreted as a change in the ECB’s mon-
etary policy strategy.  The ECB will seek to 
maintain the inflation rate below, but close 
to, 2 per cent over the medium term. The 
Council confirmed the use of the two-pil-
lar framework of the strategy as a tool to 
organise the information relevant for as-
sessing the different risks to price stabil-
ity. It also announced that the introductory 
statement of the President at the ECB Press 
Conference following a Governing Coun-
cil rate-setting meeting now starts with an 
analysis identifying the short- to medium-
term risks to price stability. This assess-
ment has been called the economic analy-
sis. It is followed by an assessment of the 
medium- to long-term risks to price stabil-
ity, focusing on monetary indicators. This 
assessment has been called the monetary 
analysis. The Governing Council emphasised 
that the monetary analysis serves mainly as 
a means of cross-checking, from a medium 
to long-term perspective, the short to me-
dium-term indications from the econom-
ic analysis. This decision has been widely 
interpreted as the downgrading of impor-
tance of the (previous) first pillar.
 I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purpose of this Briefing Paper is to dis-
cuss the number and prioritization of cen-
tral bank objectives   . Article 105.1 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity (TEC) states price stability as the pri-
mary objective of the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) or the Eurosystem. 
At the same time this is not the sole objec-
tive mentioned as the second sentence of 
this article states: “Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the ESCB shall 
support the general economic policies in 
the Community with a view to contributing 
to the achievement of the objectives of the 
Community as laid down in Article 2.” Sup-
porters of a stabilization role of monetary 
policy interpret the second sentence of Ar-
ticle 105.1 in the sense of a duty to follow 
employment policies in times of price sta-
bility. However, opponents of such a role 
will deny this room to manoeuvre. 
The Treaty has made the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) very independent. Nowa-
days is it widely believed that a high level 
of central bank independence and an ex-
plicit mandate for the bank to restrain in-
flation are important institutional devices 
to assure price stability (Eijffinger and De 
Haan, 1996). It is thought that an inde-
pendent central bank can give full priority 
to low levels of inflation. In countries with 
a more dependent central bank other con-
siderations (notably, re-election perspec-
tives of politicians and a low level of unem-
ployment) may interfere with the objective 
of price stability. In that context the Ger- >
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man central bank is often mentioned as an 
example. The Deutsche Bundesbank was 
relatively autonomous; at the same time, 
Germany had one of the best post-Sec-
ond World War inflation records among the 
OECD countries. Indeed, the statutes of the 
ECB are largely modeled after the law gov-
erning the Bundesbank. Recent empirical 
research on central bank independence has 
also shown that the negative relationship 
between central bank independence and 
inflation is quite robust  
(see also: Berger et al., 2001). 
The monetary policy strategy of the ECB 
has three main elements: (1) a quantita-
tive definition of price stability, (2) a promi-
nent role for money in the assessment of 
risks to price stability, and (3) a broadly 
based assessment of the outlook for price 
developments. In December 2002 the ECB 
Governing Council decided to evaluate this 
strategy in the light of the experience, tak-
ing into account the public debate and the 
outcomes of research undertaken by staff 
of the Eurosystem. The results of this eval-
uation were published in May 2003, which 
we will discuss later in this Briefing Paper.
 M o n e t a r y   p o l i c y   s t r a t e g y     
 o f   t h e   E C B
The primary objective of the ESCB is price 
stability. However, the Treaty does not pro-
vide a specific definition of this objective. 
In October 1998 the Governing Council 
of the ECB defined price stability as fol-
lows: a year-on-year increase of the Har-
monized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
for the euro area, which does not exceed 2 
per cent in the medium term. Issing et al. 
(2001) point out that this quantification is 
in agreement with the stated preferences of 
European governments as expressed several 
times in the European Council’s Broad Eco-
nomic Guidelines. 
The HICP is a comprehensive measure for 
inflation, reflecting the focus of the gen-
eral public on consumer goods 2. The aim of 
an inflation rate “below 2 per cent” clearly 
delineates the maximum rate of inflation 
deemed to be consistent with price stabil-
ity. The wording “year-on-year increas-
es” implies that persistent price decreases 
- that is to say deflation in the measured 
price index - would not be considered to be 
consistent with price stability either. The 
Governing Council explicitly announced 
that price stability is to be maintained over 
the medium term, thereby acknowledging 
that price levels may be temporarily distort-
ed by short-term factors.     
The wording “for the euro area” highlights 
that area-wide developments, instead of 
specific national or regional factors, are the 
only determinants of decisions regarding 
the single monetary policy. A year-on-year 
increase of the HICP for the euro area as a 
whole represents price stability, even if in-
creases in national price indices are above 2 
per cent per year.
At the time the monetary policy strategy of 
the ECB was introduced, it rested on two 
“pillars”. The first pillar is a prominent role 
for money. As inflation in the long run is 
considered to be a monetary phenomenon, 
the ECB Governing Council has announced 
a quantitative reference value for the an-
nual growth rate of a broad monetary ag-
gregate (M3). The focus on M3 is justified, 
according to the ECB (2001), by its favora-
ble empirical properties like a stable money 
demand relationship. Furthermore, M3 has 
shown to exhibit leading indicator proper-
ties for future inflation (see also Issing et al., 
2001). The reference value for M3 growth, 
which was set at 4.5%, should however not 
be considered as intermediate monetary tar-
get, “in order to avoid an automatic mon-
etary policy reaction to fluctuations in M3 
growth that may not be associated with in-
flationary pressures, but that may result, 
for example, from .... financial innovations” 
(Issing, 1999, p. 20). Although the first pil-
lar is sometimes presented as only referring 
to M3 growth (see e.g. Begg et al., 2000), 
the ECB examines not only to what extent 
M3 growth deviates from the reference val-
ue, but analyzes underlying causes as well. 
Quite some attention is being paid, for in-
stance, to the growth rates of the compo-
nents of M3, notably the growth rate of 
credit supplied to the private sector. 
The second pillar is a broadly based assess-
ment both of the outlook regarding price 
developments and of the risks to price sta-
bility in the euro area as a whole. A wide 
range of economic and financial indicator 
variables is used for this purpose, which can 
be grouped in (a) gap measures (i.e. meas-
ures of the discrepancy between output, or 
its factors of production, and their equilib-
rium values); (b) measures of cost pressure; 
(c) international prices and exchange rates; 
and (d) other asset prices (see Issing et al., 
2001). The indicators include: 
• the HICP and other price indicators in the 
euro area, including producer prices as 
these are a leading indicator for HICP in-
flation. In addition, price developments 
in the world markets for raw materials are 
closely monitored, especially, of course, 
the price of crude oil. Oil prices have a 
clear impact on inflation in the euro area. 
The ECB also analyses the deflator of 
the euro area’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), as well as the deflators of its com-
ponents. Finally, the ECB keeps an eye on 
real estate prices, where possible.
• indicators for the real sector. The ECB 
monitors real GDP and its components, 
and also the production of the manufac-
turing and other sectors. The capacity uti-
lization rate also belongs to this category 
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• confidence indicators, including the eco-
nomic sentiment indicator and various 
consumers and business sectors confi-
dence indicators.
• indicators for the labor market. Employ-
ment and unemployment in the whole 
economy and by sector, as well as wages 
and unit labor costs (total and its com-
ponents) and productivity belong to this 
category. 
• exchange rates. The euro-dollar exchange 
rate, but also (real and nominal) effec-
tive exchange rates are closely monitored 
by the ECB. The initial decline of the euro 
vis-à-vis the dollar has had quite some im-
pact on inflation in the euro area. 
• financial market indicators. To this group of 
indicators belong various interest rates, as 
well as the term structure and stock market 
indices. The long-term yield and the term 
structure are often considered to contain 
information concerning (expectations of) 
future inflation and economic growth.
• projections for inflation and economic ac-
tivity. The Governing Council also takes 
forecasts by others - like the Consensus 
forecasts - as well as the projections of 
the staff of the ECB into account in its 
decision-making process
 T h e   E C B   s   e v a l u a t i o n   o f   i t s     
 m o n e t a r y   p o l i c y   s t r a t e g y  
On 8 May 2003 the Governing Council of 
the ECB made the results of the evaluation 
of its monetary policy strategy public. The 
Council considered that, so far, the strategy 
worked satisfactorily. As Issing (2003, pp. 
4-5) put it: 
“Since 1999, medium and long-term infla-
tion expectations - as measured by survey 
data or financial market indicators - have 
remained consistent with the ECB’s defini-
tion of price stability. This is all the more 
remarkable given that the ECB started with-
out a track record of its own and that it has 
experienced a number of sizeable adverse 
price shocks. As a result of these shocks, 
HICP inflation was above (and sometimes 
significantly above) 2% for quite some time. 
But, as the shocks gradually unwound, so 
inflation has returned towards levels com-
patible with price stability. Medium and 
long-term inflation expectations remained 
well anchored throughout this period.”
Still, the Council took two decisions in 
view of the evaluation. First, the Govern-
ing Council confirmed its definition of price 
stability. At the same time, the Governing 
Council agreed that it will aim to maintain 
inflation rates close to 2 per cent over the 
medium term. According to the ECB press 
release, “This clarification underlines the 
ECB’s commitment to provide a sufficient 
safety margin to guard against the risks of 
deflation. It also addresses the issue of the 
possible presence of a measurement bias in 
the HICP and the implications of inflation 
differentials within the euro area.”
As pointed out by Issing (2003), an impor-
tant reason to aim at an inflation close to 
2 per cent is the need for a safety margin 
against potential risks of deflation. In case 
of strong deflationary pressures, mon-
etary policy may become less effective if 
central bank interest rate management is 
constrained by a liquidity trap or a “zero 
bound” problem. According to analyses of 
the ECB, such constraints should not pose 
a significant threat if inflation remains suf-
ficiently above zero. To aim at inflation 
rates close to 2 per cent offers a safeguard 
in this respect. At the same time, it takes 
into account both the potential presence 
of a measurement bias in the HICP and the 
implications of inflation differentials of a 
structural nature within the euro area.
Second, the Council decided that its policy 
decisions will continue to be based on “a 
comprehensive analysis of the risks to price 
stability”. The Council noted that, over time, 
the analysis under both pillars of the mon-
etary policy strategy has been deepened 
and extended. However, in order to “clarify 
communication on the cross-checking of 
information in coming to its unified overall 
judgement on the risks to price stability”, 
the introductory statement of the President 
has henceforth followed a new structure. It 
starts with the economic analysis to “iden-
tify short to medium-term risks to price 
stability”, followed by the monetary analy-
sis “to assess medium to long-term trends 
in inflation in view of the close relationship 
between money and prices over extended 
horizons.” As in the past, monetary analysis 
takes into account developments in a wide 
range of monetary indicators including M3, 
its components and counterparts, notably 
credit, and various measures of excess li-
quidity. According to the Governing Coun-
cil, the monetary analysis serves mainly as 
a means of cross-checking, from a medium 
to long-term perspective, the short to me-
dium-term indications from the econom-
ic analysis. To underscore the longer-term 
nature of the reference value for monetary 
growth, the Governing Council decided to 
discontinue the practice of an annual review 
of the reference value for M3 growth.
Even though it was supposed to be a clari-
fication of its objective of price stabil-
ity, many observers have interpreted the 
statements of the ECB on price stability as 
a change in its inflation objective. For in-
stance, Sibert (2003) argues that: “This 
presentational slight of hand should fool 
no one; this is a distinctly dovish change in 
policy. When it was originally announced 
that inflation was to be kept at less than 
two percent, the natural interpretation was 
not that the ECB was aiming to keep infla-
tion just below two percent. Given the floor 
of zero, the obvious interpretation was that 
the ECB was aiming for about one percent 
and viewed the costs of deviating from this 
as rising sharply as inflation either rose to 
two percent or fell to zero percent.”
Likewise, the decision on the two-pillar 
strategy has been widely interpreted as im-
plying that the first pillar has become less 
important in the monetary strategy, even 
though ECB officials stressed the continuity 
of the strategy. Svensson (2003) summa-
rizes the Governing Council decision as fol-
lows: “Keeping the two-pillar strategy but 
reducing the prominence of the first pil-
lar by putting it second and discussing the 
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monetary pillar (relabeled “monetary analy-
sis”) after the “broadly-based assessment” 
(relabeled “economic analysis”), seeing it 
mainly as a means of “cross-checking” the 
“economic analysis”. This is a change in the 
right direction, but it is not enough.”
Similarly, De Grauwe (2003) states: “the 
ECB is downgrading the importance of the 
money stock (M3) in its monetary policy 
strategy, and rightly so. It just did not make 
sense anymore to pretend that the mon-
ey stock is the most important variable to 
watch. This variable is so much polluted by 
noise that it rarely gave the right warning 
signal of future inflation.”
 C o n c l u s i o n s
The Treaty has made the European Central 
Bank (ECB) very independent. Nowadays is 
it widely believed that a high level of central 
bank independence and an explicit mandate 
for the bank to restrain inflation are impor-
tant institutional devices to assure price 
stability. It is thought that an independent 
central bank can give full priority to low lev-
els of inflation. In countries with a more de-
pendent central bank other considerations 
(notably, re-election perspectives of politi-
cians and a low level of unemployment) may 
interfere with the objective of price stabil-
ity. Recent empirical research on central 
bank independence has also shown that the 
negative relationship between central bank 
independence and inflation is quite robust.
Before the ECB started its operations, the 
main elements of its monetary policy had 
been decided upon by the Governing Coun-
cil in October 1998. The original strate-
gy consisted of three elements. First, the 
Council provided a formal definition of price 
stability, i.e. yearly inflation for the euro 
area of less than two percent in the medium 
term. Second, money growth was assigned 
a prominent role in the assessment of the 
risks to price stability. This was known as 
the first pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy. 
Third, a broadly based evaluation of the 
threat to price stability, using a wide array 
of economic and financial variables. This 
was the second pillar. 
In May 2003 the ECB announced the out-
comes of its internal evaluation of this 
strategy. Even though the ECB stressed the 
continuity of its strategy and stated that 
the decisions taken were merely about clar-
ification, these decisions have been widely 
interepreted as a change in the ECB’s mon-
etary policy strategy.  The ECB will seek to 
maintain the inflation rate below, but close 
to, 2 per cent over the medium term. The 
Council confirmed the use of the two-pil-
lar framework of the strategy as a tool to 
organise the information relevant for as-
sessing the different risks to price stabil-
ity. It also announced that the introductory 
statement of the President at the ECB Press 
Conference following a Governing Coun-
cil rate-setting meeting now starts with an 
analysis identifying the short- to medium-
term risks to price stability. This assess-
ment has been called the economic analy-
sis. It is followed by an assessment of the 
medium- to long-term risks to price stabil-
ity, focusing on monetary indicators. This 
assessment has been called the monetary 
analysis. The Governing Council emphasised 
that the monetary analysis serves mainly as 
a means of cross-checking, from a medium 
to long-term perspective, the short to me-
dium-term indications from the econom-
ic analysis. This decision has been widely 
interpreted as the downgrading of impor-
tance of the (previous) first pillar.
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